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Richard Eldridge

ON KNOWING HOW TO LIVE:
COLERIDGE'S "FROST AT MIDNIGHT"

How ought human beings to live? It is both hard to ignore this question
and hard to see how to go about answering it rationally.
Moral philosophers have typically presented their works as deserving serious
attention because they have supposed them to contain well-argued answers to

this question. One very general way of describing the strategy of moral
philosophers is to say that they have begun by attempting to specify precisely the
sense of "ought" as it is used in this question. Thus "ought" has alternately been
taken to mean such things as "would it be profitable for," "in society is it
necessary for," "it is typical of ideal," and "would it be rational for." In concert,

moral philosophy has alternately been conceived of as a part of a theory of happiness, a theory of civil society, a theory of perfection, or a theory of rationality.
But which, if any, of these ways of doing moral philosophy is the correct one?

The very proliferation of approaches and answers to the question of how human

beings ought to live encourages a kind of despair about whether any rules of
conduct can be rationally justified for people in general. Noticing this proliferation, philosophers of a skeptical cast of mind have denied that any rules about

how human beings ought to live can be rationally defended. AU putative
rational defenses of such rules, so it has been claimed, amount to nothing more

than pieces of cant and dogma. Reflecting this intuition, "moralistic" has come
sometimes to mean "priggishly preachy." Thus Richard Rorty has observed that
"the attempt to answer . . . the moral agent's request for justifications [of
answers to such questions as "What ought we to do with ourselves?" and "How
ought we to live?"] with descriptions of a privileged domain [wherein such
justifications can be discovered] is the philosopher's special form of bad
faith — his special way of substituting pseudo-cognition for morad choice."1
Moral philosophers, or those who would attempt rationally to defend rules
about how to live, so Rorty would apparently have it, talk not good scientific

sense auid not liberating or entertaining poetic nonsense, but pure humbug.
(Rorty adds that "the positivists were absolutely right in thinking it imperative to
213
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extirpate metaphysics, when 'metaphysics' means die attempt to give knowledge
of what science cannot know.") We are urged to take a pragmatic attitude
toward moral rules. AU diere is to know about rules about how to live is that

sometimes some people have made them up and found them useful, not that any
of diem have any deeper rational basis. "[T]he claim that the customs of a given
society are 'grounded in nature' is not one which [the pragmatist] knows how to
argue about. He is a pragmatist because he catnnot see what it would be like for a
custom to be so grounded."2 Rorty does not claim that naturalistic talk or the

talk of what he calls "atoms-in-the-void science" is die only sensible kind of talk.
The remarks of sociologists, psychoanalysts, critics, and so forth are not
senseless, according to Rorty. But he does hold diat traditional philosophical
talk of knowing morad rules through reflection or reasoning is senseless. The
reason for diis is diat no one has ever succeeded in giving "ought" a clear sense in
such a way that amy claims of the form "human beings ought to do *" can be
rationally justified to everyone.
Failing to possess incontrovertibly sound demonstrative arguments for claims

diat all human beings ought to adopt certain rules of conduct and failing to
possess a mediod, or even a glimmer of a mediod, for constructing such
arguments, it may well seem difficult not to feel compelled to adopt Rorty's
skeptical attitude toward moral philosophy. Rorty's attitude is not extraordinary; it is increasingly shared by a public which fails to find in works of moral
philosophy the sort of rational defense of rules about how to live which it has
been promised. What form could a rational justification of a claim of die form
"human beings ought to do x" take?
Yet to answer, widi Rorty, "no form; all putative universal rational justifications are merely attempts to impress one or another unjustifiable ideology on
odiers" is, it seems to me, to suffer from a failure of imagination and to

misunderstand the character of some traditional moral arguments. There may
be nondemonstrative arguments which are rationally compelling. Indeed, some
moral philosophers, some novelists, and some poets, sensitive to the historicity
of human life and to the failure of introspectionist foundationalism, have

attempted to construct compelling nondemonstrative arguments in favor of
some moral rules, understood as specifying what amy rational person who reflec-

tively considers his or her historical experiences of depression and joy will find it
worthwhile to do. Moral philosophy so conceived becomes a dieory of fulfillment for historical beings unable to justify rules of conduct a priori and subject

to cycles of moods.3 Acquaintance with what one might call general subjunctive

features of human temporal existence may enable human beings in general to

justify moral rules for diemselves. The possibility that moral philosophy might
be based on such acquaintance is what Rorty overlooks.

Certain philosophers, novelists, and poets have aimed at revealing to us diese
subjunctive features, typically not simply by pointing them out, but rather by

recording their own discoveries of diem. Their revelations are designed to teach
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us something about how to live fully or authentically. Among philosophers
engaged in this enterprise, one might think of Heidegger or Emerson, or
perhaps Wittgenstein; among novelists, Proust or Sartre; among poets, above
all the English Romantics. Coleridge's poem "Frost at Midnight" is near enough
to the historical inauguration of this enterprise in reaction to Humean skepticism to be worth considering on historical grounds alone. It also presents in a
compressed and accessible form a picture of how one might go about meditating
on one's moods in the hope of uncovering general subjunctive features of humain
life. Tracing out its progress can help us to appreciate the character of die enterprise and to test the possibilities it offers for resisting skepticism about moral
philosophy.
I

Coleridge absorbs and even endorses the skeptic's attitude to the attempt to
justify moral rules universally by deducing them from self-evident truths. But
that does not lead Coleridge to conclude that no morad rules are universally
justifiable. Coleridge is able to conceive of another method besides a priori
demonstration for justifying rules of conduct. He employs this method to justify
the particular rule "Devote yourself to reflection on the conditions of melancholia and joy and to teaching others your results."
Just how does Coleridge's method work, and is his justification of this moral
rule a good one? To answer these questions, it is important first of all to see

Coleridge as responding to Hume, whose views about the justifiability of moral
rules anticipate Rorty's.
Hume observes in the first Enquiry that "Morads and criticism are not so prop-

erly objects of die understanding as of taste and sentiment."4 In the Treatise, he
comments more pointedly on our inability to dispute rationally about questions
of conduct.

But what have I here said, that reflections very refin'd and metaphysical have little or no influence upon us? . . . The intense view of the manifold contradictions

and imperfections in human reason has so wrought upon me, and heated my
brain, that I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another. Where am I, or what? From
what causes do I derive my existence, and to what condition shall I return? Whose
favour shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me?
and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am con-

founded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most deplorable
condition imaginable, inviron'd with the deepest darkness, and utterly deprived of
the use of every member and faculty.5

The only way out of diis darkness which Hume is able to imagine is not to
discover a vocation which banishes and redeems the darkness, but radier to put
aside questions of conduct and take up am avocation.
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Most fortunately it happens, mat since reason is incapable of dispelling these
clouds, nature herself suffices in that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these chimeras. I dine,
I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, aind am merry with my friends; and
when after three or four hours' amusement, I wou'd return to these speculations,

they appear so cold, and strain'd, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to
enter into them any farther, (p. 269)

This is not a happy solution to die problem of how to emerge from die
darkness of moral despair, for some three or four hours later one's interest in
reasonings about conduct is likely to reawaken, and to bring in its train the

despair which one had sought to escape, now redoubled by the thought that its
occurrence is inevitable even when one willfully flees it. Whatever interests and
worries first gave rise to refined and metaphysical reflections are, it seems, not

so easily quieted by "blind submission" to "follies . . . natural and agreeable"
(pp. 269-70).
One may wish to escape the despair attending the realization diat one cannot

rationally justify any claims about the propriety of certain pursuits. One may
wish to know how to live. But how could these wishes be realized? Is it not true

that, as Hume argues and Rorty claims, we cannot know what pursuits are
proper for us? Is it not die case that we will inevitably, like Hume, become

dejected periodically, and is it not the case that all we can do when dejected is
wait either for our avocations to distract us or for our bodies' chemistries to

change? If not, why not?

In seeking answers to these questions, we may do well to attend to the descriptions of the travails of dieir lives produced by the major writers of
autobiographical literature during die Romantic periods in England and
America and by later writers who inherited their preoccupations. Such writers
as Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, Emerson, and John Stuart Mill suffered
through crises in their mental lives very like Hume's fall into darkness. The state
of mind Coleridge and Wordsworth called dejection is precisely the subjective
state accompanying the realization that one does not know, and may well be
unable to know, how to live. Wordsworth, in Book XI of the Prelude, describes
this state of mind in very nearly the same terms Hume had used in the Treatise
for describing his mental crisis.
This was the crisis of that strong disease,
This the soul's last and lowest ebb; I drooped,
Deeming our blessed reason of least use

Where wanted most: "The lordly attributes
Of will and choice," I bitterly exclaimed,
"What are they but a mockery of a Being
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Who hath in no concerns of his a test

Of good and evil; knows not what to fear
Or hope for, what to covet or shun."6

Unlike Hume, however, Wordsworth did not take refuge from his dejection

in avocations, and he did not resign himself to the necessity of learning how to
live with skepticism.
Depressed, bewildered thus, I did not walk
With scoffers, seeking light and gay revenge
From indiscriminate laughter, nor sate down
In reconcilement with an utter waste

Of intellect; such sloth I could not brook.7

Wordsworth's unwillingness to accept the notion diat there is either no particular vocation for which he is suited or no way to know what it is and to adopt
a policy of self-entertainment are typical of the writers named above. As M. H.

Abrams notes, "[T]he distinctive Romantic genre of the Bildungsgeschichte
describes a painful process of self-formation, crisis, and self-recognition, which
culminates in a stage of self-coherence, self-awareness, and assured power that is
its own reward."8 How one might successfully pass through diis painful process
is generally taken to be discernible not through abstract philosophical reflection

and not through scientific investigation, but through meditation on the events of
one's life. As Abrams describes Wordsworth's account in the Prelude of his

achievement of self-understanding and self-integration, the "ultimate goodness
governing the course of his life is brought into question by his suffering and

crisis of spirit, then is established by the outcome of his experience, which is then
represented as prototypical for the men to whom he addresses himself." 9

That Coleridge, like Wordsworth, was continuously occupied with attempting to understand his place in nature as a diinking being and with establishing,
despite die failure of introspectionist foundationadism, what pursuits are appropriate to that nature is evident in his correspondence. In February of 1801,

Coleridge wrote to Davy, "I have been thinking vigorously during my illness, so
that I cannot say that my long, long wakeful nights have been all lost to me. The
subject of my meditations has been the relations of thoughts to things; in the
language of Hume, of ideas to impressions."10 A month and a half later, he
announced to Poole that these meditations have borne fruit. "I have overthrown

the doctrine of association, as taught by Hatrtley, and with it all the irreligious
metaphysics of modern infidels — especially the doctrine of necessity."11 Thus
Coleridge claims to have discovered both that he is free auid that he has a place
in a meatningful divinely ordained scheme.
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II

Coleridge's discoveries of his own freedom and of a vocation fit for a free
being are described most fully auid carefully in "Frost at Midnight," written in
February 1798.12 The poem opens with the poet's calm, recollective recording of
his sense diat he is both somehow within nature and human society and
somehow outside them or sealed off from them by his lack of an understanding

of exactly how and for what purposes natural and social phenomena are produced.

The Frost performs its secret ministry,
Unhelped by any wind. The owlet's cry
Came loud — and hark, again! loud as before.
The inmates of my cottage, all at rest,
Have left me to that solitude, which suits
Abstruser musings: save diat at my side

My cradled infant slumbers peacefully.
(U. 1-7)

His attention skips from event to event in nature, from the formation of die frost
to the lack of wind to the owlet, until he is somewhat startled by the repetition of
the owlet's cry. That nature is capable of startling him reminds him that he does
not live in continuous harmony with nature, that he does not know, and has not

accepted, his place in nature, diat nature's ministrations, to him and within
herself, are secret. He takes others to be similarly situated in nature, to be
inmates in nature adike sealed off from knowledge of her actions, yet unlike him
to be at rest, free of worry about their situation bodi in and out of nature. (One

way to understand die poem is to take it as recording the poet's attempt to
establish that the gap between himself and others is temporary.) The poet
revoices his sense of being both surrounded by and sealed off from nature auid
from others who aire mysteriously less restless and better adapted to life in nature
dian he is as he diinks of

. . . Sea, hill, and wood,

This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood,
With all the numberless goings-on of life,
Inaudible as dreams.

(U. 10-13)

Unnumbered and inaudible, the workings of nature and social life and the poet's

place in nature pass by his understanding.
Thus the problems die poet is reflecting on are diose of how to still his

restlessness, how to adter his sense of being surrounded by nature auid society
("Sea, hill, and wood, / This populous village! Sea, and hill, and wood") yet
somehow sealed off from them, and how to come to terms with his desire to
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know his place in nature and society. Nature, in her hiddenness ("Tis calm
indeed! so calm, that it disturbs / And vexes meditation with its strange / And

extreme silentness" 11. 8-10), both calls forth the desire to know one's place in
nature and withholds its satisfaction. Recognizing this, the poet is forced to contemplate his desire to know and to query its motives, the possibility of its being
satisfied, and the likelihood of its persisting.

Wondering then whether die numberless goings-on of life can be made to
reveal their significance, and, if so, how, the poet's attention is drawn to the only

other restless thing within his notice, a piece of sooty film fluttering on the stove
grate.

Only that film, which fluttered on the grate,
Still flutters diere, the sole unquiet thing.
Methinks, its motion in this hush of nature
Gives it dim sympathies with me who live,
Making it a companionable form.
(U. 15-19)

That is to say, the poet finds, in looking at the film on die grate, an image of
himself at home in nature. The film and his spirit flutter alike, yet the film's flutterings are altogether natural phenomena, not sealed off from nature, but pro-

duced as part of nature's secret self-ministrations. The film thus represents for
die poet the union or integration of his own restlessness with the fullness and
internal connectedness of nature, of, one might say, being for itself with being in
itself. The film is both natural and alive; it "still flutters" — diat is, its fluttering
or restlessness is persistent, part of its nature, and yet not unsettling, but rather
for it what it is to be still.

The poet, however, is unable to sustain his identification of himself with the
film. It is not only a companionable form, but one
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit
By its own mood interprets, everywhere
Echo or mirror seeking of itself,
And makes a toy of thought.
(U. 20-23)

Such pieces of fluttering film were commonly known as strangers and were
thought to indicate the imminent arrival of a friend. The poet catches himself
suddenly looking at the fluttering film not merely as a thing in itself, but as
something to be interpreted. Now retrospectively, contemplating his act of identifying himself with the stranger, he is moved first to recognize the difference

between his own activity in interpreting and the stranger's causally induced
motions and then to reconfront his own restlessness and desire to know his place
in nature.
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This reconfrontation with his desire to know leads the poet to recollect similar
confrontations with that desire, brought about by its disappointment, in the
past. He recalls diat he had, when young and at school, similarly looked at the
film on the grate and invested it with meaning.
But O! how oft,

How oft, at school, with most believing mind,
Presageful, have I gazed upon the bars,

To watch that fluttering stranger!
(H. 23-26)

This memory in turn leads him to recall that, just as he had in the present for a
moment regarded the film on the grate as a natural phenomenon with manifest
significance, he had in childhood regarded natural and social phenomena as
obscurely significant, as imminently revelatory of his place in nature and of how

to live happily in nature with a stilled consciousness, knowing his place in it and
the pursuits appropriate to that place.
and as oft

With unclosed lids, already had I dreamt
Of my sweet birth-place, and the old church-tower,
Whose bells, the poor man's only music, rang
From morning to evening, all the hot Fair-day,
So sweedy, that they stirred and haunted me
With a wUd pleasure, falling on mine ear

Most like articulate sounds of diings to come!
(H. 26-33)

Thus human works (the bells) and nature (die hot air and his ear) conspired to
speak to him; that is, they possessed significance in themselves, were in harmony with one another, and thus suggested that, by grasping their message, die
child could enter into a like state of harmony with and within nature and bring

significance to his life. Or, rather, human works and nature only seemed to be
significant. Their sounds never became fully significant, but rather remained
only "Most like articulate sounds of things to come."
The promise of these sounds is not realized; the child, after hearing them
throughout die hot Fair day, falls asleep, and the poet's memory returns to his
experiences of gazing in school at the film on the grate. The child, however,
together with the poet recollecting the experiences of the child, has carried away
with him from the Fair days of his birthplace to his school days a latent sense

diat satisfaction of his desire to know how to live has not been and may not be
forthcoming. This latent sense is then reinforced by the experience, in which the
memory of the sound of the bells is embedded, of gazing in school at the
stranger. In school, the child takes the stranger to be evidence of the possibility

of being transplanted into a world where he is at home and no longer restless.
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And so I brooded all the following morn,

Awed by the stern preceptor's face, mine eye
Fixed with mock study on my swimming book:
Save if the door half opened, and I snatched
A hasty glance, and still my heart leaped up,
For still I hoped to see the stranger's face,
Townsman, or aunt, or sister more beloved,

My play-mate when we both were clothed alike!
(U. 36-43)

Thus the child's desire for nature to speak to him auid caire for him is literalized,
as the child takes the film on the grate, a natural phenomenon, to have, or portend, a particular face, namely diat of die person who will remove him from
school into another world where he will be more at home. The phrase "the
stranger's face" fuses the idea that phenomena in nature are obscurely significant
and are preparing a place for him with the idea that there are others (townsman,
aunt, or sister — familiars, yet strangers having knowledge he lacks) who already
know the significance of nature, who carry that knowledge on their faces which
in some sense dien belong to nature, and who might lead the child into a new
world, stilling his restlessness and making him joyful in his pursuits, as he is not
in school. Yet the child's desire to be led into a new world is similarly disap-

pointed. The poet's memory breaks off, the poet returns to the present, and the
child is left in school.

Thus, what unites the three scenes described in the poem — the poet's present
contemplation of die film on the grate, the child's hearing, or remembered hear-

ing, of his town church-tower's bells, and the older child's inspection in school of
the film on the grate — are the mêmes of the occurrence, frustration, and persistence of the desire to know how to live and of the consciousness of oneself as a

restless interpreting being, a consciousness which accompanies the frustration
and persistence of diat desire. The recurrence of diis desire, its frustration, and
the accompanying consciousness of self have not brought about the satisfaction
of the poet's desire to know how to live, but only the knowledge that it is possible
to survive the frustration ofthat desire, even while surmising diat it, its frustration, and the associated state of restless self-consciousness will recur.

Yet one last time, the poet imagines that he has, auid might come to know and
glory in, a place in nature, not in his life but in his life transplanted, that is, in
the life of his son. He conjectures diat his own continuing restlessness stems not
from the nature of consciousness as such, but from the circumstances of his
upbringing.
For I was reared

In the great city, pent 'mid cloisters dim,
And saw nought lovely but the sky and stars.
But thou, my babe! shalt wander like a breeze
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By lakes and sandy shores, beneath die crags
Of ancient mountain, and beneath the clouds,

Which image in their bulk both lakes and shores
And mountain crags: so shalt thou see and hear

The lovely shapes and sounds inteUigible
Of diat eternal language, which thy God
Utters, who from eternity doth teach
Himself in aU, and all things in himself.
Great universal Teacher! he shaU mould

Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask.

(11. 51-64)

Here Coleridge, having reflected on die persistence — auid persistent frustration — of his desire to know how to live by knowing his place in nature, seems to
have satisfied his desire. He has apparently uncovered the cause of his dejection — life in London — and he foresees that his son, having been freed from the

influence of this cause, will be free of dejection. The poet himself again surmises
that events in nature, including the phenomena of human life, are significant,
even providentially determined; God reveals himself to himself through them.
Although understanding of the exact character of this divine self-revelation
eludes die poet, he is nonedieless able, by diagnosing the cause of his dejection,
to assign a meaning to his life aind to envision passing that meaning on to his

son. Thus, just as God, somewhat like Hegel's Absolute Spirit, through His

work of creating all diings teaches Himself the meaning of His own original yet

undeveloped nature, so the poet, dirough his diagnostic recollections of his
experience, teaches himself how to be a teacher to his son and how to understand the significance of his experiences as preparatory for his activity as a

teacher. His proper vocation, he now surmises on the basis of his reflection on
his experiences, is diat of a teacher to his son.
Yet, despite the poet's sense of triumph in this passage at having understood
and redeemed his existence, somediing remains not quite right. The poet
perhaps realizes that, in identifying with his son aind anticipating his son's joyful,
meaningful life, he is once again anticipating, and failing to achieve, his own
transplantation into a world where he will not be troubled by restlessness. Once

again, it is die poet who is imaginatively assigning a meatning to events — this
time not to the fluttering of die film on the grate or to the sound of the bells, but

to the repeated welling up and frustration of his desire to know how to live — and
anticipating, as a result, both further evidence in the future, in his son's happy

life, of the correctness of his assignment of meaning and, through the appear-

ance of that further evidence, the ultimate establishment of his vocation as a

teacher. The poet has, again, imagined his present situation to be die first scene
in a play die progress of which will inexorably reveal the meaning of that initial
situation.

Perhaps dien die poet begins to suspect that his present assignment of mean-
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ing to his life and anticipation of his son's happiness are the result of yet one

more welling up of his own desire to know how to live, a desire that may well be
destined again to be frustrated. Unable himself to puzzle out God's self-

instruction, he is again forced to confront the fact that his vision of what his son's
life will be like is imaginatively constructed and not fully grounded. The triumphant prophesies of lines 51-64 are abandoned in favor of something more

nearly resembling unknowing hope, and perhaps faith, that his understanding
of his vocation and his son's future happiness is correct. He concludes both his
address to his son and the poem by redescribing events in nature not as full of
providential significance, but as having purposes mysteriously beyond human
understanding.
Therefore all seasons shall be sweet to thee,
Whether the summer clothe the general earth
With greenness, or the redbreast sit and sing
Betwixt the tufts of snow on the bare branch

Of mossy apple-tree, while the nigh thatch
Smokes in the sun-thaw; whether the eave-drops fall
Heard only in the trances of the blast,
Or if the secret ministry of frost
Shall hang them up in silent icicles,
Quietly shining to the quiet Moon.

(11. 65-74)

Here the poet's sense of the incomprehensibility of natural phenomena has
reemerged. Nature's works do not speak to him, but are instead again secret,
silent, aind quiet. The wind, in its silence, entrances itself, and does not carry the
poet away widi it; he feels himself once again to be left behind. The recitation of
the changing appearances nature assumes from season to season and the suggestion that these appearances are continuously evolving into one another without

being sharply distinct combine to make one in following die images feel oneself, together with the poet, to be surrounded by nature spatially as nature's
temporal self-development surrounds or passes one by. The repeated whether-

or formulations leave the poet's summary in the register of surmise,13 indicating
that the poet lacks confidence in his own ability to know what will happen when,
and why. The poet's tone remains calm and optimistic. Yet the idea that nature
will be sweet to or favor his son represents a withdrawal on the poet's part from
die idea that his son will grasp God's providential plan. His son is now
represented more as passively affected by nature than as wandering and knowing. The poet himself is unable with any assurance to predict the course of

events in nature; nature continuously and fluidly develops herself, beyond the
poet's grasp.
Reconfronting his inability to know either nature's plan or the pursuits for
which he is intended, the poet retires into a more mature self-consciousness than
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that which attended his childhood frustration of his desire to know how to live

joyfully. The poet now identifies himself with the hanging icicles. As Harold

Bloom reads the concluding lines, "The secret ministry of frost is analogous to
die secret ministry of memory, for both bind together apparently disparate
phenomena in an imaginative unity. The frost creates a surface both to receive
and reflect the shining of the winter moon. Memory, moving by its overtly arbitrary but deeply designed associations, creates an identity between the mature
poet and the child who is his ancestor as well as with his own child." li The icicles
are doomed to fall, not knowing why, just as the poet is doomed to die, he now
surmises, without knowing for what pursuits he was intended. Like the icicles,
the poet hangs, for a moment no longer fantastically scripting his future but
radier reading his past. Yet he does not hang altogether at odds with himself or
in the state of restless dejection in which he had found himself in like circumstances in the past. As die eavedrops combine with one anodier and reflect
the nature which surrounds them, thus evidencing their place in it and drawing
our attention, so the poet's memories combine with one another and reflect, to

the poet and to us, his continuing existence as a being who wishes to know how
to live, who fails to know how to know that, and who is nonetheless able to take

satisfaction in the hope that others will find in his record of his experience of
reflection, recollection, and self-recognition words to characterize themselves.

Recollective reflection, it seems, may be an end in itself—just as the icicles seem
designed in their glimmering to draw our attention — so long as diat reflection
shines out to others, instructs them, and draws them to it. The poet seems, for a
time, to be calm, as he was often not to be, auid well engaged in reflecting
himself to himself and others to themselves.
Ill

It is not then that the poet has discovered a priori through reflection divorced
from his historical experience die secret meaning and purpose of his own life,
having thus refuted Humean skepticism about our ability to know a priori how

to live. The skeptic's demand for an a priori demonstrative argument in favor of
the rightness of certain rules of conduct has not been met. Yet the skeptic's conclusion that, in die absence of the satisfaction of this demand, all claims of the

form "human beings in general ought to do V are merely expressions of an
unjustifiable ideology now looks flat and unconvincing. Coleridge has
elaborated through reflection on his own past moods a theory of human
historical existence and of what it is for historical beings subject to alternations of
mood to feel fulfilled. He has sketched an account of general subjunctive
features of humain experience, and this account in turn makes a compelling, a

posteriori, nondemonstrative argument in favor of engaging in self-reflection.
Coleridge's account of general subjunctive features of human experience is

plausibly not a special one, is plausibly applicable to human beings in general, in
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so far as the experiences of desire, frustration, and recollective calm which he

records occur involuntarily, despite his best efforts to plot his life in such a way as
to prevent their recurrence. In their repetitiveness, they present themselves a
posteriori as essential features of human life. As Mary Crenshaw Rawlinson has
observed in commenting on Proust's search for essences, "the essence, the real

idea, . . . cannot be separated from the power of traversing time which
distinguishes it." I5 The desire to know how to live, the frustration of diat desire,
dejection, and the transfiguration of dejection into hope through recollective
self-reflection present themselves as essential features of human life through

their traversais of time recorded in Coleridge's poetry.
Hume's skepticism has thus been absorbed into the poet's historically
generated sense that human beings in general desire to know how to live, are

frustrated in that desire, and yet can experience moments of hope, joy, and selfintegration in tracing momentarily significant repetitions among events in
nature (such as repeated wellings up, frustrations, and recollections of desire)
and, perhaps more importantly, in imagining themselves to be anticipators of
the experiences of and teachers of others. To live well as a historical being subject to moods — to be absorbed in one's pursuits and free of dejection — is to

reflect others to themselves through self-reflection. (Here is perhaps the place to
add that Hume managed throughout his life to do this or to conceive of himself
as doing this rather better than did Coleridge. Hume did not entirely fail to live
well, as Coleridge nearly did. Hume's failure, like perhaps Rorty's, is that he did

not understand what his living well consisted in. Coleridge understood this, yet
was less able than Hume continuously to conceive of himself as reflecting others

to diemselves.) As eavedrops may collect themselves into am icicle, hanging, for
a time, silently, yet reflectively shining in the light of the moon, so the poet
hangs "incumbent o'er the surface of past time,"16 perhaps knowing his nature
and others', perhaps knowing which pursuits suit him and others.
Coleridge wins his knowledge of how to live first of all through his recollective
discovery of the common thread running through his past experiences of dejection, namely the thread of the welling up and disappointment of his desire to

know how to live, and secondly through his discovery of how, in envisioning the
records of his self-reflections to be useful to others, to calm himself and free
himself of dejection. Unlike Hume, Coleridge thought he understood and could

make available to us the pattern of the recurrence of dejection aind a dejectionconcluding sense of likeness to and usefulness to others. We are not led by "Frost
at Midnight" to form beliefs about how to live through argumentation or persuasion, the modes of belief formation which Mill isolated as characteristically

employed in works of science. Rather, "Frost at Midnight" acts, as Mill says
poetry in general acts, "by offering interesting objects of contemplation to the
sensibilities,"17 in this case Coleridge himself. The poet's abandonment of a

priori demonstrative argument grants the skeptic his case against a priori
reason, while his reflections on his experience remove its sting. By presenting us
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with a sequence of reflections on die part of a historical being, the poet is able "to
indicate that his vision has been earned, diat it can survive reference to die com-

plexities and contradictions of experience" 18 because it is generated out of them.
"Frost at Midnight" invites us to contemplate Coleridge's particular way of
making himself intelligible to himself and his particular remarks about how to
live. Recently, Alasdair Maclntyre has argued that making ourselves intelligible
to ourselves by telling stories about ourselves and others is necessary and sufficient for knowing how to live. Maclntyre claims that "we understand our own
lives in terms of the narratives that we live out"; 19 we acquire pictures of the

ends or shapes of our lives by telling ourselves stories about them. "To ask "What
is the good for me?' is to ask how best I might live out [the narrative] unity [of
my life] and bring it to completion" (p. 203).
If that is the case, then those who have attempted to tell the stories of

lives — among them poets, who often narrate stretches of their own lives, and
among them Coleridge — have something to teach us about how to live well.
They can show us die unities of mood and activity possible in the lives of various
people variously circumstanced. By doing this repeatedly, they can show us the
unities of mood and activity possible for human beings as such. Togedier with
other kinds of literature, poetry "articulates . . . formfs] of individual and social
life" (p. 118).

Distinct individual lives need not always have distinct shapes or ends which
suit diem; distinct people need riot always find dejection or joy while engaged in

different activities. There may be such a thing as human nature, and, if there is,
it seems diat narratives of unities of moods and activities are just what is needed
to show us what it is and how it bears on how we ought to live. Indeed, Mac-

lntyre goes so far as to claim that all persons who, like Coleridge, wonder how to
live have a property in common which makes a single, though very general,
shape or end suitable for adi of dieir lives. Moreover, the shape of life Maclntyre
has in mind is the very shape Coleridge finds his life assuming: that of an
unending quest for knowledge of how to live. As Maclntyre puts it, provision-

ally "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man"

(p. 205).
It is not the case that everyone will be moved by "Frost at Midnight" and so
inclined to adopt the rule that we ought to reflect on our experiences and teach
others about them. In this respect, poetry does not satisfy moral philosophy's

highest aspiration of providing incontrovertible a priori knowledge about how to
live to everyone. As Mill went on to observe, "Poetry, which is the delineation of

the deeper and more secret workings of human emotion, is interesting only to
those to whom it recalls what they have felt, or whose imagination it stirs up to
conceive what they could feel, or what they might have been able to feel, had
their outward circumstances been different."20

But to admit this is not to deny that poetry can help to satisfy a very high

aspiration of moral philosophy. It is not in particular to deny diat each person
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would or should adopt the rule "Frost at Midnight" recommends if only he or she
were to reflect fully enough on the character of his or her historical existence.
Poets do not compel us either through argumentation or experimentation to

adopt beliefs. But it does not follow that they have nothing to teach us and that
their recommendations about how to live are not rationally defensible. The rules
they recommend may be defended as rules which we would or should adopt

were we to come through reflection to understand ourselves as historical beings
of a certain kind with certain kinds of moods. Teaching is not always a matter of
either arguing or providing evidence, and it is especially unlikely to assume
these forms when what is to be taught is a view about the nature of human
beings and about how they ought to live. It is sometimes rather a matter of
imparting a way of looking at things. A poet's invitation to contemplate recognizably real human beings reflecting on their activities and moods seems to be

just the sort of diing which could help us to discover the relations between moods
and activities in human life and to overcome dejection. Thus, even in the
absence of incontrovertibly sound demonstrative arguments for conclusions
about how to live, we can and often do manage — rationally — to acquire senses
of what it is for human beings with moods to live well.
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